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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code § 38-1-11 (2001)]: [Mechanics9 Liens] Enforcement -Time for -Lis 
pendens -Action for debt not affected -Instructions and form affidavit and motion. 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the 
residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the 
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to 
enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon 
which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, 
Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act. (Emphasis added). 
(4)(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff/Appellee Joel Sill ("Sill") asks this Court to uphold a ruling of the Utah 
Court of Appeals judicially rewriting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) 
("Subsection 4(a)") and applying it to facts outside of its express terms. Subsection 4(a) 
The parties agree that the statutes determinative of this case are those that were 
in place in February of 2002. 
clearly and expressly states that it applies only to mechanics' lien claimants who file an 
action and serve a "complaint" on the owner of residential property. Subsection 4(a) further 
expressly states that what is to be served in such cases are instructions and forms regarding 
"the owner's rights" or "available rights" which "the owner may exercise" under Utah's 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-101 et 
seq. (the "LRFA"). In this case, it is undisputed that neither of those express conditions and 
requirements for application of Subsection 4(a) exists. The Court of Appeals therefore erred 
in reversing a well-reasoned decision of the district court, and holding Subsection 4(a) 
required Defendant/Appellant Bill Hart d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart"), the defendant in 
the case who never filed or served a complaint, to serve upon Sill, with Hart's answer which 
included a counterclaim (the "Counterclaim"), instructions and forms relating to the LRFA, 
even though Sill admittedly had no rights under the LRFA. Based upon that ruling which 
impermissibly deviates from the plain language of the statute as chosen and drafted by the 
Legislature, the Court of Appeals wrongly reversed an award to Hart of more than 
$300,000.00 in prejudgment interest accrued on amounts owed by Sill, and attorney fees and 
costs incurred by Hart in two years of litigation to collect the amounts Sill owed. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling applying Subsection 4(a) to this case, and Sill's 
arguments defending it, attempt to force the square peg of this case into the round hole of 
Subsection 4(a). Such application is contrary to the plain language of Subsection 4(a) 
specifically, and to the overarching purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes generally. 
Hart also won a jury verdict awarding him the full principle amount of 
$314,500.00 that he claimed was owed by Sill. During the pendency of this appeal, Sill 
has paid that principal amount. 
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals, reinstate the district court's decision 
declaring Subsection 4(a) inapplicable to this case, and reinstate the district court's award 
of interest and attorney fees and costs to Hart. 
In his cross-appeal Sill attacks that portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling that 
Subsection 4(a) is not a "jurisdictional" statute. Since Subsection 4(a) does not apply to 
begin with, this Court need not even reach the issue of whether it is jurisdictional. But 
Sill's jurisdiction arguments also fail in any event. Sill bases his jurisdiction argument on 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e) (2001) ("Subsection 4(e)"), which states that if a lien 
claimant fails to serve items required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant is "barred" 
from maintaining or enforcing the lien. There is, however, nothing inherently 
"jurisdictional" about the word "barred," and Sill fails to show any clearly expressed 
intention of the Legislature that Subsections 4(a) or 4(e) limit jurisdiction, as is necessary 
to overcome the established legal presumption of jurisdiction. Sill's analysis also fails to 
view Subsection 4(a) in the context of the overall mechanics' lien statutes of which it is a 
part. When viewed in that context, as required by the very authorities upon which Sill 
himself relies, even where it applies Subsection 4(a) does not impose a jurisdictional bar. 
This Court therefore should uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that 
Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are not jurisdictional. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY OF APPELLANT HART 
TO SILL'S RESPONSE TO HART'S OPENING BRIEF 
I. APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION 4(a) TO THIS CASE IS CONTRARY 
TO THE FACE OF THE STATUTE ITSELF AND THE RULES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. Subsection 4(a) Applies Specifically and Exclusively to Service of A 
"Complaint," and Cannot Be Applied to Hart's Counterclaim 
Subsection 4(a) expressly refers specifically and exclusively to a "complaint" as 
the only pleading with which LRFA instructions and forms are to be served. The Court 
of Appeals therefore erred in ruling that statute "does not require the service specifically 
of a complaint," and that it applied to Hart's Counterclaim in this case. Sill v. Hart, 128 
P.3d 1215, 1218,1} 9 (emphasis added) (a copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this 
case is attached as Addendum No. 1 to Hart's opening brief to this Court). 
The Court of Appeals', and Sill's, reliance on American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. 
Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) is misplaced. That 
case serves only to highlight that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to counterclaims. 
American Rural held that "a counterclaim to foreclose a mechanics' lien ... clearly 
qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien'" under the attorney fees provision of 
the mechanics' lien statute. Id. at 193 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18). The Court of 
Appeals and Sill argue in this case that Subsection 4(a) also applies to counterclaims 
because it too refers to "an action" to enforce a mechanics' lien, and under American 
Rural a counterclaim qualifies as "an action." 
That, however, is only half of the analysis. As Sill himself correctly notes, "in 
construing a statute a court assumes that when the Legislature enacted the statute, it was 
aware of prior court decisions interpreting similar statutory language." (Sill's Brief, p. 9 
(citing Donahue v. Warner Bro. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 261, 272 P.2d 177, 
180 (1954)). It therefore must be assumed as a matter of law that when the Utah 
Legislature enacted Subsection 4(a) in 2001 it was aware of the 1997 decision in 
American Rural interpreting "action" to include counterclaims. Accordingly, had the 
Legislature intended Subsection 4(a) to apply to counterclaims it would have left the term 
"action" broad and unqualified as it did in the attorney fee provision that was the subject 
of American Rural. The Legislature, however, did not do that. Instead, it added to the 
term "action" a limiting reference specifically to a "complaint." That reference to a 
"complaint" limits and qualifies the term "action," restricting application of 
Subsection 4(a) to only an "action" where the lien claimant files and serves a 
"complaint." 
Well-settled rules of statutory construction provide that courts must "assume that 
each term in the statute was used advisedly." E.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., 2004 
UT App 143, \ 7, 91 P.3d 858, cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added). 
Also, in statutory text the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, and 
omissions in statutory language must be taken note of and given effect. E.g., State v. 
Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 21, 64 P.3d 1218; Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 
UT App 354, f 11, 36 P.3d 528. As applied to this case, the Legislature's choice to add a 
reference in Subsection 4(a) specifically to a "complaint" must be deemed to have been 
purposefully and advisedly made, intending to and in fact distinguishing the term 
"action" as used in Subsection 4(a) from its broader, unqualified application as used in 
the attorney fee provision, limiting application of Subsection 4(a) to exclude any other 
pleadings but a "complaint" from its reach. Such express reference to a "complaint" 
should be respected and enforced by the courts. By ruling as it did that Subsection 4(a) 
nevertheless applies to Hart's Counterclaim, the Court of Appeals strayed from the 
express statutory language and violated each of those rules of statutory construction. It 
also impermissibly inferred a substantive term into the statute (i.e. counterclaim) that 
simply is not there, and improperly rendered meaningless Subsection 4(a)'s express and 
exclusive reference to a "complaint" as the only pleading to which Subsection 4(a) 
applies, all in violation of additional rules of statutory construction. See e.g., Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^  30, 38 P.3d 291 (courts 
must "not infer substantive terms into [statutory] text that are not already there"); Lund v. 
Brown, 2001 UT 75, If 23, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) ("[A]ny interpretation which renders 
parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.") (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
3
 Sill's argument that the term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) "is used with no 
qualifying or limiting language" and therefore is expanded by the word "action" to 
include and apply to counterclaims (Sill's Brief, p. 9), is backwards. The term 
"complaint" in Subsection 4(a) is the qualifying and limiting language, restricting the 
term "action," which otherwise may have applied to all actions, including counterclaims, 
as it does in the fee provision addressed in American Rural. 
Sill's argument that restricting Subsection 4(a) to actions in which the lien 
claimant serves a "complaint" somehow ascribes to the Legislature a "hide-the-ball 
attitude" must be tongue-in-cheek. The Legislature can hardly be accused of hiding the 
ball where it clearly and expressly stated on the face of Subsection 4(a) that it applies 
Not only are they contrary to the language of Subsection 4(a) and established rules 
of statutory construction, but Sill's arguments that "complaint" as used in Subsection 4(a) 
includes counterclaims are not even supported by the authorities he cites. Each of those 
authorities, State ex rel Road Comm 'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962), 
Harmon v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695 (1943), Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627 
(A.D. 1990), and Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1184 (3d ed. 2004), 
spoke merely to the pleading standards required for counterclaims generally {i.e., that 
they must state facts sufficient to support a claim for affirmative relief, as distinguished 
from merely stating a defense to a plaintiffs complaint).4 None of them dealt with 
only where a lien claimant files an action and serves a "complaint." It is instead the 
interpretation offered by Sill whereby "complaint" would actually mean and include 
things other than a complaint, that hides the ball. 
4
 In footnote 4 of his Brief, Sill argues that counterclaims and complaints are 
interchangeable purportedly because "the courts - this Court included - frequently refer 
to the pleading that sets forth a counterclaim as a 'counterclaim complaint.'" (Sill's 
Brief, p. 13). Sill cites four cases in support of that broad claim: Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 
UT 11,1 1, 67 P.3d 1000; Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 138 (3rd 
Cir. 2001); Foundation for Interior Design Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & 
Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co. v. Ellis, 28 
F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994). Aside from the fact that four isolated references to use 
of the made-up term "counterclaim complaint" in courts throughout the entire country are 
hardly "frequent," none of Sill's four cited cases attached substantive significance to their 
loose use of that term. Certainly none of those cases dealt with Subsection 4(a) which is 
at issue in this case, nor even involved any statutory language expressly referring 
specifically to a "complaint" as the pleading triggering application of certain statutory 
requirements, as Subsection 4(a) does. This Court should not use a made up term like 
"counterclaim complaint," whether the use of such term is "frequent" outside of the 
mechanics' lien context or not, to circumvent the express language of Subsection 4(a), 
and its specific reference to a "complaint." To do so would render the Legislature's use 
of the term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) meaningless, "inoperative or superfluous 
[and] is to be avoided." Lund, 11 P.3d at 282. 
Subsection 4(a), nor involved construction of the word "complaint" or "counterclaim" as 
any statutory term, which is the issue in this case. 
Sill argues that in drafting Subsection 4(a) the Legislature "would have chosen" 
the term "complaint" from the list of different pleadings with the intent that it "would 
cover both an original complaint and a counterclaim," purportedly in light of what Sill 
claims is "the prevailing view of courts and commentators that a counterclaim is a 
complaint." (Sill's Brief, p. 14).5 It is fatal to Sill's argument that the Utah Legislature 
5
 Sill repeatedly refers throughout his brief to this purportedly "prevailing view." 
None of the cases he cites, however, even support Sill's position. In fact, they ultimately 
support Hart's position. For example, Sill's cited cases of Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 
251 (Ga. App. 1999), Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 533 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.N. Y. 
1982), and Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 106 N.E. 541 (Ind. App. 1914) all equated 
complaints with counterclaims because the legislatures had expressly done so in the 
statutes there at issue. Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting statute which prohibited 
bringing "a complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal custody" in various 
circumstances, including "as a counterclaim"); Brink's, 533 F.Supp. at 1123 n.3 (quoting 
statute that "cause of action contained in a counterclaim or cross-claim shall be treated, as 
far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint"); Keeney, 106 N.E. at 542 
(discussing statute under which a "counterclaim" was a pleading "which in another action 
would entitle the defendant to a judgment against the plaintiff). Those statutes, and 
therefore those cases, stand in stark contrast to Utah's Subsection 4(a) at issue in this 
case, which refers exclusively to a "complaint," and draws no parallel at all between a 
complaint and a counterclaim. As shown in the main text above, rules of statutory 
construction require that the exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) must 
be deemed to have been purposefully and advisedly adopted by the Legislature, and must 
be respected and enforced by the courts. 
Even the cases cited by Sill which held statutory uses of the word "complaint" 
applied to counterclaims do not help Sill's position in this case. The history of 
Subsection 4(a)'s use of the term "complaint" makes that statute unique and 
distinguishable from the use of that term generally in other states' statutes in Sill's cited 
cases of Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plant Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150 (D. Med. 2005) 
and Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 189 A.2d 428 (Del. 1963). As shown in the main text 
above, it has previously been held in Utah that the term "action" standing alone in Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes includes and applies to counterclaims. American Rural Cellular, 
939 P.2d at 193. Addition of the term "complaint" in Subseclion 4(a), therefore, was as a 
specifically uses the term "counterclaim" when it intends a statute to apply to 
counterclaims. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2005) (stating parties may not 
maintain "any action, suit, counterclaim cross complaint, or proceeding" unless certain 
requirements are met) (emphasis added); id., § 78-7-35 (separately delineating filing fees 
applicable to a "complaint," and to a "counterclaim," and other pleadings) (emphasis 
added).6 
limiting term, restricting the term "action," which otherwise, standing alone, would have 
applied to a counterclaim, to mean and refer instead specifically and only to a 
"complaint." The Court therefore should not in this case construe the statutory term 
"complaint" broadly to apply to other pleadings such as counterclaims. 
Lebrecht v. Orefice, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. 1951), cited by Sill, merely held that 
a statute allowing re-filing of an "action" applied equally to complaints and 
counterclaims. Since the term "action" as used in Subsection 4(a) is specifically limited 
to one in which a "complaint" is filed, Lebrecht is inapposite. Liberty Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Rainey, 791 N. E.2d 625 (111. App. 2003), also cited by Sill, also is inapposite because it 
dealt with construction of terms under a private contract rather than a statute, and its 
ruling that the term "complaint" as used in the contract broadly included counterclaims 
was specifically due to a public policy at work in that case favoring having disputes 
submitted to arbitration where a contract calls for arbitration. That public policy simply 
is not implicated in the case at bar. As discussed more fully in the main text below, the 
public policy implicated in this case is the statutory protection of parties who, like Hart, 
work to improve real property. That policy of course favors a construction of 
"complaint" to exclude and not apply to Hart's Counterclaim. 
6
 In footnote 6 of his Brief, Sill attempts to distinguish these two statutes 
"because they did not mirror the context in which "complaint" is used in 
subsection (4)(a)." (Emphasis in original). Sill misses the point that what those statutes 
show is that the Legislature knows how to state that a statute is to apply to a counterclaim 
when it intends that result, as distinguished from Subsection 4(a) in this case which 
specifically, expressly, and exclusively used the term "complaint." Sill's citation to 
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also is fatal to his attempt to blur the 
distinction between a counterclaim and a complaint because Rule 8(a) on its face 
distinguishes between those documents, specifically using the term "counterclaim" where 
it intended Rule 8 to apply to a counterclaim. Sill's argument that "[n]othing in the plain 
language of Rule 13(a) suggests that a counterclaim is not a complaint," is also totally 
incorrect. Rule 7(a) identifies a complaint. Rule 13(a) separately identifies a 
counterclaim, which is a part of an answer. There is nothing in Rule 13(a), or any other 
B. There Was Nothing To Serve Upon Sill On The Face Of 
Subsection 4(a) 
Subsection 4(a) expressly states that what is to be included "with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence" are: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under 
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act 
[identified and referred to above, and hereinafter, as the "LRFA"]; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the 
residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available 
rights under [the LRFA]. [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) (emphasis added)]. 
Sill, however, did not have any rights under the LRFA in this case, as shown in 
Hart's opening brief, and which Sill and the Court of Appeals acknowledge and admit. 
There was therefore nothing to serve upon Sill on the face of Subsection 4(a) even if Hart 
had filed and served a "complaint," which he did not. 
Sill focuses on the part of Subsection 4(a) referring to the service of LRFA 
instructions and forms by the 'lien claimant," which he argues applies broadly to general 
contractors and subcontractors alike. That myopic focus, however, is unwarranted and 
unavailing. It is well-established that when inteipreting a statute the Court should look to 
"the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12 
K 17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). Therefore, even for the sake of argument, 
construing broadly who is subject to the requirements of Subsection 4(a) there still is the 
rule of civil procedure, to suggest that a counterclaim is a complaint. Instead, those 
pleadings are separately named and defined, and there are specific references to those 
separate pleadings throughout the rules. 
question of what is necessary to meet those requirements. What Subsection 4(a) requires 
is service of forms relating to "the owner's rights under [the LRFA]," and "available 
rights under [the LRFA]" which "the owner may exercise." Since Sill indisputably and 
admittedly did not have any such rights in this case, there simply were no instructions or 
forms required to be served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a). Sill's 
position that Subsection 4(a) does not limit the requirement to serve LRFA forms and 
instructions to situations where the owner is able to exercise LRFA rights is flatly 
contrary to the statutory language. 
Sill argues that lien claimants should not be allowed to make the determination of 
whether an owner in a given case is eligible for relief under the LRFA. But the 
Sill's citations to various mechanics' lien statutory sections do not support, and 
actually undermine, the Court of Appeals' application of Subsection 4(a) to this case. To 
begin with, the sections Sill cites distinguishing between contractors and subcontractors 
(i.e., Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-2, -14, & -17) are inapposite. Nothing in those sections 
changes, nor does Sill even claim that they change, the fact that Sill had no rights under 
the LRFA in this case. 
Sill also cites to a provision of the LRFA which states "the original contractor ... 
shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions are necessary for the owner 
to be protected under" the LRFA. Id. § 38-11-108(1). Had the Legislature intended 
Subsection 4(a) to apply to an "original contractor" such as Hart, it would have said so 
expressly as it did in Section 38-11-108(1). 
Next, Sill cites to the provisions in the mechanics' lien statutes regarding the 
content required in all liens (id. § 38-l-7(2)(h)), and the limitations period for filing an 
action to enforce a mechanics' lien (id. § 38-l-7(3)(c)). Each of those provisions, 
however, apply on their face to all liens and all lawsuits, without limitation or 
qualification of any kind. In sharp contrast to such provisions, the Legislature expressly 
limited the circumstances to which Subsection 4(a) applies and in which LRFA 
instructions and forms must be served to only those in which the lien claimant files the 
lawsuit and serves a "complaint" on the owner, and even then only if "the owner" has 
"available rights" under the LRFA that he "may exercise." 
Legislature itself has already made the determination that they should, stating in 
Subsection 4(a) that what is to be served are instructions and forms relating to "the 
owner's rights" "available" and that "the owner may exercise." As with any statutory 
language, it is the party itself who must make the determination in the first instance 
whether the language applies to their situation and requires any action by them. In an 
appropriate case a court may later find a lien claimant made an incorrect determination 
and is therefore barred by Subsection 4(a) for failing to serve an owner with LRFA 
instructions and forms to which they were entitled. But this is not such a case. Here, it is 
admitted by Sill, and otherwise, indisputable, that Sill had no rights under the LRFA as 
against his unpaid general contractor, Hart. There were therefore no LRFA forms or 
Q 
instructions required to be served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a). 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION UNDERMINES THE INTENT 
AND PURPOSES OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES 
Sill's Brief several times references the importance of evaluating the context in 
which statutory language appears, and the legislative intent and "purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve." (Sill's Brief, p. 20 (quoting Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist. v. 
Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1f 8, 94 P.3d 234)). Sill readily acknowledges that the 
Sill's attempt to compare Hart's arguments in this case to those made in 
Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) is without merit. The argument in Landmark was that the court should carve out 
an exception to the statutory requirement based on the legal sophistication of the party 
entitled to notice. Id. at 261-62. By contrast, in the case at bar the question at issue is 
whether Subsection 4(a) applies to this case at all to begin with. Hart is not arguing for 
an exception to, but rather seeks judicial enforcement of, the statutory language defining 
and limiting the scope and extent of the statute's applicability on its face. 
intent and purpose of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes, of which Subsection 4(a) is a part, 
has been long and repeatedly recognized to be, and is, to protect those like Hart who 
perform labor and furnish materials for the improvement of real property. He 
nevertheless argues to uphold the Court of Appeals' opinion which changes the plain 
language of Subsection 4(a) and extends it to facts and circumstances to which on its face 
it clearly does not apply (i.e., the counterclaim of an unpaid general contractor, in favor 
of an owner with no right or ability to use the LRFA referenced forms and instructions). 
This is all to the detriment of, and is an impediment to, recovery by Hart whom the jury 
found substantially improved Sill's property. That result is contrary to the well-settled 
and admitted intent of the mechanics' lien statutes. In attempting to defend that result 
Sill argues that compliance with provisions of the mechanics' lien statutes is required 
before one is entitled to their benefits and protections. That, of course, begs the question 
of whether Subsection 4(a) is a requirement that applies to Hart. On its face it is not, for 
all other reasons discussed above. 
Sill's argument that the appellate court's ruling is not a windfall to him is false. 
That ruling opens a window for Sill to evade payment of more than $300,000.00 in 
prejudgment interest and attorney fees accrued on and incurred to recover the amount 
which the jury found he rightfully owed to Hart (the full principal amount claimed by 
Hart). It is undisputed by Sill that recovery of attorney fees and interest, in addition to 
the principal amount owed, is a vitally important part of the mechanics' lien system. 
E.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, If 24, 94 P.3d 270, 
276 (noting attorney fee provision strengthens protection of lien statute "by ensuring 
someone who successfully uses a mechanics' lien to enforce a payment obligation ... will 
not ultimately bear the legal costs of that enforcement action. It also functions as a 
penalty for one who wrongly fails to pay for enhancement to his property."); Triple I 
Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1998) (stating general rule that 
unpaid mechanic is entitled to interest). Allowing evasion of those substantial amounts 
by Sill as the Court of Appeals' ruling would, is an enormous windfall in a case where 
service of the LRFA forms and instructions, even if they were required, admittedly could 
not have made any difference whatsoever to the outcome of this case. 
Allowing such windfalls to delinquent property owners like Sill, at the expense of 
contractors like Hart, is contrary to the mechanics' lien statutes' purpose, particularly 
when based upon novel interpretations of isolated procedural provisions that apply them 
beyond their clear, plain and express language to require actions from unpaid contractors 
admittedly of no use or benefit at all to the owner. This Court therefore should reverse 
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the ruling of the district court that Subsection 4(a) 
simply does not apply to this case. 
HART'S OPPOSITION TO SILL'S CROSS-APPEAL 
Sill's Cross-Appeal attacks the portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling confirming 
that, even where it applies, Subsection 4(a) is not "jurisdictional" in nature. Sill's 
argument in this regard actually is an attack upon the Court of Appeals' ruling in the case 
of Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, 121 P.3d 717, which previously ruled Subsection 
4(a) does not divest the court of jurisdiction over lien claims and upon which the Court of 
Appeals largely relied in this case. Sill's attacks upon Pearson and arguments that 
Subsection 4(a) is jurisdictional are without merit. The Pearson ruling is well-reasoned 
and sound. Moreover, many of Sill's cited authorities actually also confirm that 
Subsection 4(a) indeed is not jurisdictional. This Court therefore should uphold the Court 
of Appeals' ruling in this case that Subsection 4(a) is not a jurisdictional bar to Hart's 
mechanics' lien claims in any event. 
I. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONFIRM THAT 
SUBSECTION 4(a) IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL 
Sill argues that Pearson overlooked the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
1 l(4)(e) (2001) ("Subsection 4(e)") and rendered that statute meaningless in violation of 
rules of statutory construction in holding it was not jurisdictional.9 In its entirety, 
Subsection 4(e) states: 
If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the instructions 
and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be 
barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
9
 Sill cites the rules of statutory construction requiring construction of statutes 
"according to their plain meaning ... giving meaning to all parts, and avoid rendering 
portions of the statute superfluous." (Sill's Brief p. 35 (quoting LKL Assoc, Inc. v. 
Farley, 2004 UT 51, \ 7, 94 P.3d 279)). He notes the rules of statutory construction 
requiring the courts to "presume the legislature used each term advisedly" and to give 
effect to "every word" chosen by the Legislature. (Id., p. 36 (quoting State v. Maestas, 
2002 UT 123, fflf 52-53, 63 P.3d 621). Finally, he acknowledges that the ultimate goal of 
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and purpose 
underlying the statute. (Id., pp. 35-36). The irony of Sill's citation to statutory 
construction rules for his jurisdiction argument is that all of those rules and aims of 
statutory construction highlight and confirm that Subsection 4(a) on its face simply does 
not apply to this case to begin with, for all of the reasons shown more fully above, 
rendering all of his arguments as to the purported jurisdictional nature of Subsection 4(a) 
irrelevant. 
Sill argues that in stating a lien claim is "barred" if a lien claimant fails to comply 
with Subsection 4(a), Subsection 4(e) attaches a consequence to that failure to comply. 
The existence of that consequence, Sill argues, makes the statute jurisdictional. But Sill's 
jurisdiction argument rests entirely on the flawed premise that the term "barred" in 
Subsection 4(e) per se imposes a jurisdictional consequence or bar, as opposed to a mere 
procedural bar or affirmative defense. That premise is unsupported by, and indeed 
contrary to, Utah law. 
The starting point for analyzing whether a statute has jurisdictional implications is 
the legal presumption that "district courts retain their grant of constitutional jurisdiction 
in the absence of a clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction." Labelle v. 
McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15 at % 8, 89 P.3d 113,114 (emphasis added). Sill 
completely fails to show any clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction in 
Subsections 4(a) and 4(e), nor indeed is there any. Nothing in the word "barred" is 
inherently jurisdictional in nature. In its plain and ordinary meaning, "barred" is defined 
to mean "[s]ubject to hindrance or obstruction by a bar or barrier which, if interposed, 
will prevent legal redress or recovery." Black's Law Diet, at 150 (6th ed. 1990) 
(emphasis added). There is absolutely nothing in that definition, nor otherwise in the 
language of Subsection 4(e), supporting Sill's contention that use of the word "barred" in 
Subsection 4(e) was intended by the Utah Legislature to impose a jurisdictional bar to 
suit. To the contrary, the fact that the definition of "barred" includes only "if interposed" 
supports the appellate court's rulings in Pearson, and in this case, that Subsection 4(e) is 
not jurisdictional, but is a mere procedural bar, an affirmative defense only that is subject 
to being waived. 
Uses of the term "barred" in other Utah law support this analysis. For example, 
Utah Code § 34A-3-109(2)(a), for example, states that a "claim described in 
Subsection (2)(b) is barred/' unless certain requirements are met by the claimant within a 
certain time. (Emphasis added). It has been recognized, however, that the statute is an 
affirmative defense, and is not jurisdictional. See Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor 
Comm n, 2005 UT App 401, f 19, n. 7; 122 P.3d 700 (Orme, J., concurring). Many other 
affirmative defenses are said to "bar" enforcement of otherwise valid actions, without 
being jurisdictional. See e.g., Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 
2004 UT App 436, f 23, 104 P.3d 646, 652 (holding claim was "barred" by the statute of 
limitations); Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118, ^  10, 90 P.3d 649, 652 (subsequent 
action seeking the same relief as a prior action is "barred by res judicata) (emphasis 
added); Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, % 28, 57 P.3d 603, 610 
("Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a 
disadvantage to the other party."). There are many potential "bars" to suit. Labeling 
something as a "bar," however, does not per se make the "bar" jurisdictional, as opposed 
to merely procedural in nature. 
Sill's argument that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are "jurisdictional" also ignores the 
well-settled principal of statutory construction, properly applied in Pearson, that when 
analyzing whether a provision is "jurisdictional," the Court must look at the statutory 
language and the intent of the overall statute as a whole. As this Court stated in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978): 
There is no universal rule by which directory [not-jurisdictional] provisions 
may, under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are 
mandatory [jurisdictional]. The intention of the legislature, however, 
should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word form 
should stand in the way of the legislative intent.. . The statute should be 
construed according to its subject matter and the purpose for which it was 
enacted. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 
1980) ("A statute is, of course, to be construed in light of its intended purposes."); Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (whether a statutory 
requirement is jurisdictional depends upon whether "it is of the essence of the thing to be 
done," viewing the intent of the statute as a whole). 
In Pearson, the court properly applied these rules of statutory interpretation when 
it undertook a thoughtful analysis of Subsection 4(e) within the overall context and 
purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes as a whole. Pearson correctly concluded that 
Subsection 4(a) is not essential to the core purposes of those statutes (i.e., to protect 
parties like Hart who provide labor and material to improve real property), and that 
service of LRFA instructions and forms under Subsection 4(a) is not "jurisdictional" 
because it is a "minor component" of the overall mechanics' lien statutory scheme, is 
"wholly informational," and noncompliance with it would not prejudice the other party. 
Pearson, 2005 UT App. 383 at ^ 7 & 12, 121 P.3d at 719 & 721 (citing Labelle, 2004 
UT 15 at % 17, 89 P.3d at 116). A copy of the Pearson case is attached hereto as an 
addendum. 
Contrary to Sill's claims, nothing in Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) is ignored or 
rendered obsolete or meaningless by the holdings in Pearson, and in this case, that they 
are not "jurisdictional." Those rulings leave intact the ability of a property owner to 
invoke those statutes as a procedural bar, as an affirmative defense, in those cases where 
Subsection 4(a) applies. The fact that the consequence or "bar" of Subsection 4(e) is a 
procedural defense, rather than a jurisdictional one, does not render it meaningless, 
particularly in light of the complete absence of any clearly expressed legislative intent to 
limit jurisdiction. 
II. THE "TWO-PRONGED CONSEQUENCES" OF SUBSECTION 4(e) DO 
NOT RAISE THE "BAR" TO A JURISDICTIONAL STATUS 
Throughout the briefing and argument of this issue Sill's argument historically has 
always been that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) rob the courts of jurisdiction to enforce 
mechanics' lien claims. In his Brief to this Court, Sill now argues for the first time that 
there are "two-pronged consequences" to Subsection 4(a) and 4(e). Apparently 
recognizing that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) do not impose a "jurisdictional" bar to 
enforcing mechanics' liens, as shown above, Sill now focuses instead on the word 
Sill's emphasis heretofore has been on this Court's ruling in Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), and trying to equate Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) of the 
mechanics' lien statutes to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA") notice of 
claim provision that was held in Madsen to be jurisdictional. In his Brief to this Court, 
however, Sill has significantly downplayed his reliance upon Madsen and the attempted 
comparison of Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) to the UGIA. That obviously is because Madsen 
and the UGIA actually further confirm that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are not 
jurisdictional. As noted in Madsen, the UGIA notice provision was held to be 
jurisdictional because it expressly required certain actions be taken before a party could 
even file suit under it. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 249-50. By contrast, on its face 
Subsection 4(a) expressly contemplates providing LRFA information and forms after suit 
"maintaining" in the language of Subsection 4(e) which says certain lien claimants "shall 
be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien." Sill now argues that imposes a second 
prong consequence, automatically extinguishing a mechanics' lien upon a lien claimant's 
failure to comply with Subsection 4(a). (Sill's Brief, pp. 34-35, 38). 
There simply is no authority for Sill's automatic lien extinguishment argument. 
Subsection 4(e) certainly does not say the lien is automatically extinguished if LRFA 
instructions and forms are not served.11 Regardless of whether the focus is on the word 
"maintaining" or on the word "enforcing," the operative term in Subsection 4(e) still is 
"barred." As shown above, there is nothing "jurisdictional" about the term "barred." In 
fact, Sill himself refers to Subsection 4(a) as a mere "procedural requirement^" and notes 
the lack of service under it as a mere "procedural default." (Sill's Brief, pp. 28, 33, 
and38).12 
is already filed, "with the service of the complaint." Unlike UGIA, compliance with 
Subsection 4(a) of the mechanics' lien statutes is not a precondition to filing suit, and 
therefore is not jurisdictional. 
11
 The only case cited by Sill in purported support of his automatic lien 
extinguishment argument \sAAA Fencing v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 
(Utah 1989). That case, however, did not deal at all with Subsections 4(a) or 4(e). It was 
a statute of limitations case dealing with timely filing of a lien foreclosure lawsuit, which 
is fundamentally different than Subsection 4(a) which deals with procedures and defenses 
available after suit is filed. 
12
 Even if Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) applied to this case at all, which they do not, 
failure to serve the notices referenced in those statutes would at most give rise to an 
affirmative defense for insufficiency of process, which was waived by Sill proceeding 
through more than two years of litigation and up to trial before ever mentioning it. The 
cases of Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Keller v. Southwood N. 
Med. Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998) are instructive. The statute at issue in those 
forcible entry cases required a court indorsement to be placed on the summons served 
with the complaint. The plaintiffs in both cases failed to obtain that court indorsement. 
III. THE PEARSON COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE LACK OF 
PREJUDICE AS A RELEVANT FACTOR IN ITS JURISDICTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Sill's argument that the lack of prejudice to the owner of a residence has no place 
in the analysis of whether Subsection 4(a) is jurisdictional is directly contrary to 
controlling Utah law. Lack of prejudice is a long and well-recognized factor that is to be 
considered in jurisdictional analyses. This Court has explained: "[a] designation is 
merely directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with a view merely to the 
proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business, and by the failure to obey no 
prejudice will occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Beaver County 
v. Utah State Tax Comm % 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (quoting Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis added); see also 
e.g., Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15 at \ 17, 89 P.3d at 116 (holding 
statutory requirement that request for prelitigation panel review be mailed to the health 
care providers in medical malpractice cases is not jurisdictional, including because "it is 
difficult to envision how a health care provider could be prejudiced by being deprived of 
a copy") (emphasis added). This Court also has included lack of prejudice as a factor 
The court found that failure to comply with the statutory court indorsement requirement 
gave rise to an insufficiency of process defense, but that the defendants had waived that 
defense by not raising it until late in the litigation. Fowler, 838 P.2d at 677-78; Keller, 
959 P.2d at 106. Just like the indorsement requirement under the statute at issue in 
Fowler and Keller, where it applies Subsection 4(a) prescribes that certain information be 
included with the service of process. Also just like Fowler and Keller, failure to serve 
such items under Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) may arguably give rise to a defense for 
insufficiency of process, but such defense would not automatically/?erse bar Hart's 
mechanics' lien claims. Any such bar must be timely raised by an owner or it is waived. 
Even if Subsection 4(a) applied to the facts of this case, Sill waived any defective service 
defense under that statute by admittedly not mentioning it until the week before trial. 
properly considered in evaluating the consequence for failures to meet requirements of 
mechanics' lien statutes as well. See e.g., Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift 
& Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1990) ("Unless we find that Projects' alleged 
failures have compromised a purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, those failures will be 
viewed as technical, and in the absence of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.") 
(emphasis added). 
Lack of prejudice, therefore indisputably is an appropriate part of the analysis as to 
1 "\ 
why Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional. In this case it is indisputable that there was 
no prejudice to Sill. He admits that he had no rights against Hart under the LRFA. 
Accordingly, he could not have made any use of nor benefited in any way from the 
LRFA forms and instructions referenced in Subsection 4(a) even if he received them. He 
therefore was not prejudiced one iota by not having received them. This Court should 
therefore uphold that part of the Court of Appeals' ruling that, even if it applies to this 
case to begin with, compliance with Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional. 
13
 Even Lyons v. PortAuth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 643 N.Y.S. 2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996), the sole authority upon which Sill relies in arguing to the contrary, does not 
support him. That New York case held that consideration of prejudice was precluded 
only after it had been determined that the applicable statute was jurisdictional. Id. at 571-
72 (finding first that "[compliance with the condition precedent in the statute of giving 
sixty days notice is mandatory and jurisdictional," and only then stating the portion 
quoted by Sill that consideration of whether the other party was prejudiced by the failure 
to comply was immaterial because it was jurisdictional). That case does not hold (and 
even if it did it would not be binding in the face of Utah's contrary law) that lack of 
prejudice is irrelevant to determination of whether a statute is jurisdictional as an initial 
threshold matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Where the Legislature specifically said in Subsection 4(a) that it applies only if a 
lien claimant serves a "complaint" the Court of Appeals held the statute "does not 
require the service specifically of a complaint." Where the Legislature specifically said 
what is to be served under Subsection 4(a) are forms relating to "the owner's rights" that 
are "available" and which "the owner may exercise" under the LRFA, the Court of 
Appeals held the statute requires service even where the owner indisputably has no rights 
under the LRFA. Each of those holdings are outside of and contrary to the plain 
language of Subsection 4(a) specifically, and are contrary to rules governing construction 
of mechanics' lien statutes generally. They each improperly punish Hart for not 
providing forms that admittedly did not apply to this case and could not have changed its 
outcome. This Court therefore should reverse the Court of Appeals on each or either of 
those rulings, and reinstate the decision of the district court that Subsection 4(a) did not 
apply to this case or require any action by Hart. 
Even if Subsection 4(a) applied to this case (which it did not), the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that it is not jurisdictional. There simply is no clearly 
expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction in or by Subsections 4(a) and 4(e), as is 
necessary to overcome the legal presumption of jurisdiction. Nor is there any evidence 
otherwise that any applicable consequence or bar under those post-filing procedural 
sections was intended other than as an affirmative defense only. A jurisdictional bar also 
would be contrary to the overall intent and purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes, 
affording a large windfall to the owner in a case where there admittedly was never any 
prejudice to the owner. This Court therefore should uphold the ruling that 
Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional and otherwise is not any bar to Hart's mechanics' 
lien Counterclaim, and should allow Hart to recover attorney fees, costs, and interest for 
successfully prosecuting his mechanics' lien Counterclaim. 
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Addendum 
PEARSON 
Cite as 121 P.3d 717 
2005 UT App 383 
Robert PEARSON dba Robert Pearson 
Construction, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
Suzanne J. LAMB, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20040613-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 9, 2005. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 2005. 
Background: Laborer filed complaint 
seeking foreclosure of a mechanics' lien. 
Following a bench trial, the Third District 
Court, Silver Summit Department, Bruce 
Lubeck, J., entered decision in favor of 
laborer, and denied homeowner's motion 
for a new trial. Homeowner appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, James 
Z. Davis, J., held that: 
(1) laborer's failure to serve homeowner 
with instructions and a form affidavit 
did not divest trial court of jurisdiction 
to hear action, and 
(2) laborer was entitled to attorney fees 
reasonably incurred on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
William A. Thorne Jr., J., concurred in result 
only. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1) 
Determination of whether trial court has 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law, which appellate court reviews for cor-
rectness, according no deference to the trial 
court's determination. 
2. Appeal and Error <£=>842(1) 
Questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that are reviewed for cor-
rectness, giving no deference to the district 
court's interpretation. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <s>265 
Mechanics' Liens Act's requirements 
that lien claimant provide instructions and a 
form affidavit along with the complaint were 
v. LAMB Utah 717 
(Utah App. 2005) 
directory, rather than mandatory, and, thus 
laborer's failure to serve homeowner with 
instructions and a form affidavit did not di-
vest trial court of jurisdiction to hear labor-
er's mechanics' lien foreclosure action, where 
laborer complied with Act to such an extent 
that homeowner did not even notice laborer's 
oversight for more than 18 months after 
complaint was filed and more than one month 
after homeowner stipulated that laborer had 
complied with all statutory procedural re-
quirements; laborer's failure to comply did 
not compromise a purpose of Act, no conse-
quences attached to laborer's failure to com-
ply, and homeowner suffered no prejudice. 
West's U.C.A. § 38-l-ll(4)(a). 
4. Statutes <®=>227 
Whether a procedure prescribed by stat-
ute is jurisdictional depends on whether the 
procedure is mandatory or directory. 
5. Statutes <3=>227 
While a procedure prescribed by statute 
is generally considered mandatory when con-
sequences are attached to the failure to act, 
the purpose of the statute and the legisla-
ture's intent are of the utmost importance. 
6. Statutes <s=>227 
There is no universal rule by which di-
rectory statutory provisions may, under all 
circumstances, be distinguished from those 
which are mandatory. 
7. Statutes <S>227 
A statutory designation is mandatory, 
and therefore jurisdictional, if it is of the 
essence of the thing to be done. 
8. Mechanics' Liens @»3 
Mechanics' Liens Act was passed pri-
marily to protect laborers who have added 
value to the property of another, but also to 
protect the property owner's right to convey 
clear title. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-1. 
9. Statutes e=>227 
Unlike mandatory statutory designa-
tions, a designation is merely "directory," 
and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is given 
with a view merely to the proper, orderly, 
and prompt conduct of the business, and by 
the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to 
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those whose rights are protected by the stat-
ute. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
10. Municipal Corporations <s>741.20 
Party's failure to adhere to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim 
requirement is fatal and can not be remed-
ied. West's U.C.A. § 63-30d-402. 
11. Mechanics' Liens <®=>260(6), 268 
Party's failure to timely file a mechanics' 
lien foreclosure action and lis pendens is fatal 
and cannot be remedied. West's U.C.A. 
§ 38-1-11(1, 2). 
12. Mechanics' Liens <3=>260(6) 
Penalty for not commencing an action to 
enforce a mechanics' lien within the twelve-
month period provided by Mechanics' Liens 
Act is invalidation of the lien. West's U.C.A. 
§ 38-1-11(1). 
13. Mechanics' Liens <3=>268 
When a claimant fails to file a lis pen-
dens within the twelve-month period provid-
ed by Mechanics' Liens Act, the mechanics' 
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is 
rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action to enforce the lien and 
those with actual knowledge of the action. 
West's U.C.A. § 38-1-11(1, 2). 
14. Mechanics' Liens <s=>5 
Although courts have differing opinions 
about how liberally to construe provisions 
within their mechanics' lien statutes, the 
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary 
rules which have no demonstrable value in a 
particular fact pattern. 
15. Mechanics' Liens <s>310(3) 
Laborer who was awarded reasonable 
attorney fees in mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action, and who prevailed on appeal, was 
entitled to attorney fees reasonably incurred 
on appeal. 
16. Costs <®=>252 
General rule is that when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on ap-
peal, the party is also entitled to fees reason-
ably incurred on appeal. 
David B. Thompson, Miller Vance & 
Thompson PC, Park City, for Appellant. 
David M. Bennion and Michael P. Petrog-
eorge, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, ORME, and 
THORNE. 
OPINION (For Official Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
111 Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals 
the trial court's denial of her motion for a 
new trial, in which she argued that the fail-
ure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply 
with Utah Code section 38-l-ll(4)(a) divest-
ed the trial court of jurisdiction. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001). We af-
firm. 
BACKGROUND 
112 In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a com-
plaint seeking foreclosure of a mechanics' 
lien. Defendant filed her answer in Decem-
ber 2002 and an amended answer and coun-
terclaim in February 2003; neither pleading 
contained allegations that Plaintiff failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Me-
chanics' Liens Act. On April 12, 2004, the 
parties filed stipulations of fact with the dis-
trict court, stipulating that 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the 
statutory procedural requirements for per-
fecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' lien 
..; Mrs. Lamb does not defend against 
Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim on 
these statutory procedural grounds, but 
simply challenges his right to receive pay-
ment of the amounts claimed in the lien. 
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the 
district court entered a memorandum deci-
sion in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004. 
113 On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a 
motion for reconsideration (which she now 
dubs a motion for a new trial), in which she 
argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the foreclosure action because Plain-
tiff failed to comply with the requirements of 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens 
PEARSON 
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Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2004, issued 
a ruling and order denying Defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial, and on July 28, 2004, 
entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
114 The only issue before this court is 
whether Plaintiffs failure to comply with sec-
tion 38-l-ll(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens 
Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to 
hear Plaintiffs mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action. If Plaintiffs failure to comply with 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest the trial 
court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that 
Defendant waived that issue, not only by 
failing to assert it prior to trial but also by 
stipulation. 
[1,2] 11 5 The determination of whether a 
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law, which we review for correct-
ness, according no deference to the trial 
court's determination. See Beaver County v. 
Qivest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,118, 31 P.3d 1147. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are sim-
ilarly questions of law that are reviewed "for 
correctness, giving no deference to the dis-
trict court's interpretation." Board of Educ. 
v. Sandy Ciiy Corp., 2004 UT 37,11 8, 94 P.3d 
234. 
ANALYSIS 
131 H 6 Under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the 
Mechanics' Liens Act, lien claimants filing an 
action to enforce a lien must serve on the 
defendant-owner of a residence instructions 
relating to the owner's rights and a form 
affidavit along with the complaint. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant 
to section 38-1-1 l(4)(e), u[i]f a lien claimant 
fails to provide to the owner of the residence 
the instructions and form affidavit required 
by [s]ubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be 
barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien 
upon the residence." Id. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e). 
On appeal, Defendant argues that the lan-
guage of section 38-l-ll(4)(e) makes subsec-
tion 4(a) "mandatory," thereby making it a 
jurisdictional provision that cannot be waived 
and can be i'aised at any time. Defendant 
thus contends that Plaintiffs failure to com-
v. LAMB Utah 719 
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ply with requirements of section 38—1— 
ll(4)(a) deprived the trial court of jurisdic-
tion to hear Plaintiffs lien foreclosure action. 
[4-7] H7 Whether a procedure pre-
scribed by statute is jurisdictional depends 
on whether the procedure is "mandatory" or 
"directory." Beaver County v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996). 
And while a procedure is generally consid-
ered "mandatory" when "consequences are 
attached to the failure to act," Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980), 
the purpose of the statute and the legisla-
ture's intent are of the utmost importance: 
There is no universal rule by which direc-
tory provisions may, under all circum-
stances, be distinguished from those which 
are mandatory. The intention of the legis-
lature, however, should be controlling and 
no formalistic rule of grammar or word 
form should stand in the way of carrying 
out the legislative intent.... The statute 
should be construed according to its sub-
ject matter and the purpose for which it 
was enacted. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 
575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978) (alterations in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted); 
see also StaJil, 618 P.2d at 482 ("A statute is, 
of course, to be construed in light of its 
intended purposes."). Therefore, "[a] desig-
nation is mandatory, and therefore jurisdic-
tional, if it is 4of the essence of the thing to 
be done.'" Beaver County v. Utah State 
Tax Comvi'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Ken-
necott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other 
quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Projects Unlimited, hie. v. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 
1990) ("We must determine whether the rig-
orous interpretations urged by [defendants] 
are necessary to protect the interests of the 
parties in the instant situation. Unless we 
find that [Plaintiffs] alleged failures have 
compromised a purpose of the mechanic[s'] 
lien statute, those failures will be viewed as 
technical.. ."). 
[8] 118 The Mechanics' Liens Act was 
passed primarily to protect laborers who 
have added value to the property of another, 
but also to protect the property owner's right 
to convey clear title: 
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[T]he purpose of the mechanics'] lien act 
is remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen 
who have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor. On the other hand, we recognize 
that liens create an encumbrance on prop-
erty that deprives the owner of his ability 
to convey clear title and impairs his cred-
it State legislatures and courts at-
tempt to balance these competing interests 
through their mechanics'] lien statutes 
and judicial interpretations thereof. 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 (quota-
tions and citations omitted); see also Mickel-
sen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 
1989) ("[T]he mechanics'] lien law was enact-
ed for the benefit of those who perform the 
labor and supply the materials "). We 
must therefore balance a laborer's right to be 
paid for his labor and materials with the 
negative impact that liens have on an owner's 
credit and her ability to convey clear title. 
Plaintiffs failure to serve Defendant with 
instructions and a form affidavit is irrelevant 
to the lien's negative impact, whereas invali-
dating Plaintiffs right to be paid for his labor 
simply because he made a procedural error 
clearly contravenes the intended purpose of 
the Mechanics' Liens Act. Quite simply, the 
requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) have 
nothing to do with "the essence of the thing 
to be done," Beaver County v. Utah State 
Tax Comm% 919 P.2d at 552 (quotations and 
citations omitted), and Plaintiffs failure to 
comply therewith did not compromise a pur-
pose of the Act. 
119 Furthermore, the procedures set forth 
in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are not "mandatory" 
because no consequences attach to the failure 
to act. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481. The 
omission could have been remedied at any 
time during the course of the proceedings, 
or, had the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs 
mechanics' lien foreclosure action for failure 
to adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), the dis-
missal could have been easily addressed by 
either refiling or, depending on the timing, 
through Utah's savings statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2002). Under Utah's 
savings statute, 
[i]f any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plain-
tiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action other-
wise than upon the merits, . . . [the plain-
tiff] may commence a new action within 
one year after the reversal or failure. 
Id. 
1110 Although Plaintiff may have failed to 
serve Defendant with the instructions and 
form affidavit required by section 38—1— 
ll(4)(a), there is no question that he com-
menced his action within due time. "A civil 
action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint 
with the court, or (2) by service of a sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). And section 38-1-11(1) 
gives lien claimants twelve months after com-
pletion of the contract, or 180 days after the 
lien claimant last performed labor, to file 
suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1). 
Here, Plaintiff performed labor at the resi-
dence throughout the spring of 2002 and filed 
his complaint seeking foreclosure in October 
2002. Because Plaintiffs action was timely 
commenced and a dismissal for failure to 
adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) would have 
been a dismissal "otherwise than upon the 
merits," id. § 78-12-40, Plaintiff could have 
remedied his failure simply by commencing a 
new action within one year after the dismiss-
al. 
[9] U11 Unlike "mandatory" designa-
tions, "a designation is merely directory, and 
therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with 
a view merely to the proper, orderly and 
prompt conduct of the business, and by the 
failure to obey no prejudice will occur to 
those whose rights are protected by the stat-
ute.'" Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'ru 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other quota-
tions and citations omitted); see also Projects 
Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744-50 (upholding a 
lien despite its errors because such errors 
were technical and the defendant suffered no 
prejudice). Therefore, Utah courts have 
held that certain procedures required by 
statute are inconsequential to a court's juris-
diction. For example, in Labelle v. McKay 
Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 
113, the court determined that a mailing 
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requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act 
was not jurisdictional, stating that construing 
the statute "in a manner to impose jurisdic-
tional consequences on a claimant's every 
procedural stumble is to misapprehend the 
Medical Malpractice Act[]." Id. at 1114. 
While the court "[did] not ignore the fact 
that the requirement . . . [was] mandatory," 
it stated that the mailing requirement was "a 
minor component of the Malpractice Act's 
prelitigation scheme. It serve[d] a wholly 
informational role, and it is difficult to envi-
sion how [defendants] could be prejudiced by 
being deprived of [the mailing]." Id. at 1117. 
And in Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah 156, 
84 P.2d 782 (1938), the court interpreted a 
statute requiring a plaintiff to file an under-
taking, or bond, securing costs contempora-
neously with the complaint. The court held 
that the statute, while affording no discretion 
to the court, still did not create a jurisdiction-
al prerequisite: 
The language of [the statute], while posi-
tive and mandatory, when considered alto-
gether makes the requirement only that 
the undertaking be filed contemporaneous-
ly with the complaint. This certainly is no 
stronger than the language of [other] stat-
utes which require the bond to be filed 
before commencing action. But we think 
the legislature intended to make the re-
quirement so positive and unequivocal as 
to require the court to dismiss the suit if 
the bond was not filed at least contempora-
neously with the complaint if [a] motion to 
dismiss was timely mad.e. Otherwise, the 
court could continue to take jurisdiction. 
Id., 84 P.2d at 784.1 
1112 Like the statute construed in Kiesel, 
the requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are 
not conditions precedent to filing suit; they 
simply require action contemporaneous with 
the filing of the complaint. Furthermore, 
like the Medical Malpractice Act construed in 
Labelle, the Mechanics' Liens Act creates 
1. Other jurisdictions have held that certain 
"mandator}'" procedures are inconsequential to 
a court's jurisdiction. See Hodusa Corp. v. Abrav 
Constr. Co., 546 So.2d 1099, 1101 (Fla.Dist.Ct. 
App.1989) (interpreting a statute that required a 
contractor to provide a residence owner an affi-
davit prior to bringing suit, the court stated that 
"[although the furnishing of the affidavit is a 
condition precedent to bringing an action to fore-
v. LAMB Utah 721 
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numerous procedural hurdles to enforcing a 
lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2001) 
(delineating the contents of a notice of lien, 
and the time frame in which it must be filed); 
id. § 38-1-11(1), (2) (delineating the time 
frame in which suit and a lis pendens must 
be filed). Section 38-l-ll(4)(a) of the Me-
chanics' Liens Act simply requires that cer-
tain instructions and a form affidavit be 
served on the defendant; these requirements 
are "wholly informational" and but "a minor 
component" of the Mechanics' Liens Act. La-
belle, 2004 UT 15 at 1 17, 89 P.3d 113. Final-
ly, like the defendants in Labelle, it is diffi-
cult to envision how Defendant here was 
prejudiced by being deprived of the instruc-
tions and form affidavit required by section 
38-l-ll(4)(a). Defendant has not alleged 
that she was prejudiced. In fact, she even 
stipulated that she was not defending against 
the lien foreclosure on statutory procedural 
grounds, but simply "challenged] his right to 
receive payment of the amounts claimed in 
the lien." Quite simply, the requirements of 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are "directory, and 
therefore not jurisdictional," as they merely 
concern "the proper, orderly and prompt 
conduct of the business" and Defendant has 
suffered no prejudice. Beaver County v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 
(Utah 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). 
[10-13] 1113 Defendant cites numerous 
cases involving the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act [UGIA], stating that the UGIA's 
notice requirement is comparable to the re-
quirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a). Such an 
analogy is erroneous, as the UGIA's notice 
requirement has nothing whatsoever to do 
with service and mailing but instead provides 
that a claim against the state is barred unless 
notice thereof is filed with the state within 
one year after the cause of action arises. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d^t02 (2004); Stahl 
v. Utah Transit Autk, 618 P.2d 480, 481 
close a mechanics'] lien, failure to do so does 
not create a jurisdictional defect"); Campbell v. 
Graham, 144 Colo. 532, 357 P.2d 366, 368 (1960) 
(interpreting a statute that barred businesses that 
had not filed trade name affidavits from prose-
cuting suits, the court rejected the proposition 
that trade name filing is a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to filing a suit). 
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(Utah 1980). In this way, the UGIA's notice 
requirement is far more analogous to Utah 
Code section 38-1-11(1) and (2), which man-
dates that a mechanics' lien foreclosure ac-
tion and a lis pendens must be filed within 
twelve months after completion of the con-
tract or 180 days after the lien claimant last 
performed labor. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-11(1), (2). And like a party's failure to 
adhere to the UGIA's notice requirements, a 
party's failure to timely file a mechanics' lien 
foreclosure action and lis pendens is fatal and 
cannot be remedied: 
The penalty for not commencing an action 
to enforce a mechanics'] lien within the 
twelve-month period provided in section 
38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien.... 
When a claimant fails to file the lis pen-
dens within the twelve-month period, the 
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is 
rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action and those with actual 
knowledge of the action. 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 751 n. 13, 
752 (Utah 1990). Utah courts have thus 
ruled that failure to timely commence a me-
chanics' lien foreclosure action and file a lis 
pendens, like failure to timely notify the state 
of a claim against it, divests the court of 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Interlake Distribs., 
Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295, 1297-
99 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (holding that liens 
were void because plaintiffs failed to file a lis 
pendens); Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v. 
Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah Ct.App. 
1990) ("Failure to commence a timely me-
chanics'] lien foreclosure action divests the 
court of jurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co. v. 
Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 
290-91 (Utah 1986) (holding that an untimely 
mechanics' lien action is a jurisdictional issue 
and "forecloses [the parties'] rights"). 
[14] U 14 Comparison between the re-
quirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a) and the 
UGIA is misplaced also because Utah courts 
have specifically held that the UGIA is to be 
"strictly construed," Great W. Cas. Co. v. 
Utah Dep't of Transp, 2001 UT App 54,11 9, 
21 P.3d 240, whereas "substantial compliance 
with the [Mechanics' Liens Act] is all that is 
required," Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 
215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950) (relating to the legal 
sufficiency of the notice of lien); see also 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 ("Utah 
courts have recognized that substantial com-
pliance with [the Mechanics' Liens Act's] pro-
visions is all that is required."). "Although 
courts have differing opinions about how lib-
erally to construe provisions within their me-
chanics'] lien statutes, the modern trend is 
to dispense with arbitrary rules which have 
no demonstrable value in a particular fact 
pattern." Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 
744 (quotations and citation omitted). Here, 
Plaintiff substantially complied with the Act, 
to such an extent that Defendant did not 
even notice Plaintiffs oversight until May 
2004, more than eighteen months after the 
complaint was filed and more than one month 
after Defendant stipulated that Plaintiff had 
"complied with all the statutory procedural 
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing 
on a mechanics' lien." Furthermore, Defen-
dant did not allege how the instructions and 
form affidavit required by section 38-1-11(a) 
would have conferred any demonstrable val-
ue here, but instead argued that such value 
(or lack thereof) was "irrelevant" and "of no 
import." Therefore, Plaintiffs failure to ad-
here to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest 
the trial court of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
[15,16] H15 Since Plaintiffs failure to 
adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest 
the trial court of jurisdiction, we affirm the 
trial court's Final Order and Judgment in 
favor of, and its award of reasonable attorney 
fees and costs below to, Plaintiff. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (awarding 
i^easonable attorney fees to the "successful 
party" in a mechanics' lien foreclosure ac-
tion). Because "[t]he general rule is that 
when a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on ap-
peal," Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App.1991), we 
remand the matter to the district court for 
calculation of attorney fees reasonably in-
curred on appeal. 
1116 Affirmed and remanded. 
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1117 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, 
Judge. 
1118 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judge. 
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